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Mf. C. owning a tract of land bounded N. by a street, conveyed to D. the west
portion, whcreon was a well, reserving a right to use the well by the words "excepting a privilege to the well of water on said lot which I reserve for the use of
my said homestead estate," this homestead estate being the remainder of the tract.
Snhequently 1. C. devised to J. in fee simple the land between the house and
the lot conveyed to D., together with a tenement in the house, and to S. the rest
of the homestead estate. For a long period, but not for the time required to gain
an casement by prescription, all the occupants of the homestead estate had crossed
the land between the homestead and D.'s lot on their way to the well. In trespass
quare btiusuia brought by the grantees of J.against S., held,that the way across J.'s
lot could not be claimed as a way of strict necessity. Held, further, that the way
could not be implied from the circumstances of the case as one reasonably necessary.
Query. Whether the grant of a way existing defacto can be implied except in
cases of strict necessity.
.Sentde, that the claimant of such grant must be required to show that without
the way he will be subjected to an expense excessive and disproportioned to the
value of his estate, or that his estate clearly depends for its appropriate enjoyment
on the way, or that some conclusive indication of his grantor's intention exists in
the circumstances of his estate.

the Court of Common Pleas.
This was an action of tr'espass quare clausum fregit, to which
the defendant pleaded in justification a right of way. The action
was tried in the Court of Common Pleas to the court, and judgment
rendered for the defendant. It came up to this court by bill of
exceptions, the exceptions being accompanied by a statement of
facts proved on the trial ; in substance as follows :The plaintiff and the defendant were owners of adjoining lots
fronting on Weeden street, in the former town of North Providence,
now Pawtucket. The two lots were formerly part of a larger estate belonging to Michael Coyle. On the 11th May 1866, Coyle
sold the part not covered by the two lots to P. G. Delany. On
the part so sold there was a well. In the deed to Delany, Coyle
reserved a right to use the well in the following words, viz.: "Excepting a privilege to the well of water on said lot, which I reserve
for the use of my said homestead estate." The two lots now owned
by the plaintiff and the defendant were embraced in what was then
the "sai d homestead estate." Michael Coyle lived there after
the sale till his death. He died after May 16th 1866, leaving a
will bearing date of that day, which was approved November 5th
1866. In the will he devised the homestead estate to his wife for
life, and, after her decease, to his son, John Coyle, and his
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daughter, Mary Smith, the defendant, in fee simple, devising to
John the tenement occupied by himself, with the lot of land westerly from the house, being the lot now owned by the plaintiff, and
to Mary Smith the basement and attic tenements, with the share
of land belonging to the same on the easterly side thereof, being
the lot which she now owns. The widow of Michael Coyle died
many years ago. The part of the homestead estate devised to John
Coyle came to the plaintiff by mesne conveyances previous to June
17th 1872. The part devised to Mary Smith was in her possession June 17th 1872. The lot now owned by the plaintiff is
nearest the land sold to Delany. A path leading from the defendant's lot to the well crosses the plaintiff's lot. The tenants and
occupiers of all portions of the homestead house had, for some
years (but not twenty years), both before and after the death of
Michael Coyle, used the well, and the path to go to and from the
well, when they saw fit. The plaintiff built a fence across the path
on the line between his lot and the defendant's, and on the line
between his lot and the Delany lot. On the 17th June 1872, the
defendant removed the lengths of fence stretching across the path,
ai being obstructions to her right of way along the path to and
from the well, this removal being the trespass complained of.
The statement showed, in addition to the facts above stated,
that both parties could go to the well in another way, by first
passing directly from their own lots into Weeden street, then down
Weeden street to the Delany lot and across the Delany lot; but
this way was not the accustomed way-was more burdensome to
the Delany lot, and it was not known that the owners of the
Delany lot would consent to its use.
The diagram represents the premises.
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Fan Slyck, for plaintiff.

P. E. Tillinghast, for defendant.
The opinion of tle court was delivered by
DURFEE, C. J.-The plaintiff contends that Michael Coyle,
being the absolute owner of the estate, had the right to dispose of
the lot which he now owns unencumbered by the way; that Michael
did so dispose of it when he devised it to John Coyle in fee simple,
and that under John Coyle he holds it unencumbered.
The defendant contends that by force of the reservation in the
deed to Delany, the privilege of the well became appurtenant to
the homestead estate and to every part of it, and consequently to
the part which she now owns, and that inasmuch as she cannot
use the privilege without the way, she is entitled to the way, either
as a way of strict necessity, or as a way which, being reasonably
necessary, may be implied from the circumstances.
1. We do not think the defendant is entitled to the way as
a way of strict necessity. Ordinarily, such a way is implied as
incident to an express grant upon the presumption that when a man
grants a thing he intends likewise to grant that without which the
thing granted cannot be enjoyed. The privilege of the well has
not been expressly granted or devised. If it passed to the defendant it passed to her as appurtenant to the estate which was devised
to her, and that, too, without any mention, even in the most general way, of appurtenances. Now it will not be denied that
Michael Coyle bad the power to devise the estate without the
privilege. He might have done so in express terms. Or, again,
he might have expressly devised the intervening lot unencumbered
by the way, in which case the privilege, if dependent on the way,
would be extinguished by implication. The devise of the intervening lot in fee simple was primdt facie equivalent to such a
devise; for primd facie it gave the devisee as perfect an estate as
the devisor himself had, and the devisor himself had an estate so
unencumbered.
2. Is the plaintiff entitled to the way as a way which, being
reasonably necessary, may be implied from the circumstances of
the estate?
The law in regard to the creation of easements by implication
where estates which have been united in a single ownership are
severed by deed, will, or partition, is elaborately discussed in the
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third and last edition of Washburn on Easements and Servitudes,
published in 1873. The cases there collected and collated are
somewhat discordant, but they are very generally to the effect
that where the easement or quasi easement is continuous, apparent,
and reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the estate
for which it is claimed, a grant thereof will be implied. The rule
applies especially in favor of easements of air and light, lateral
support, partition walls, drains, aqueducts, conduits, and waterpipes or spouts, all these being continuous easements technically
so called-that is to say, easements which are enjoyed without any
active intervention of the party entitled to enjoy them. Ways are
not in this sense continuous easements, but discontinuous or noncontinuous, being enjoyed only as they are travelled. This distinction, however, between ways and the other easements mentioned has not been uniformly regarded, and there are cases,
especially in Pennsylvania, in which it has been held that ways
which are visibly and permanently established on one part of an
estate for the benefit of another will, upon a severance of the estate,
pass as implied or constructive easements appurtenant to the part
of the estate for the benefit of which they were established:
Kieffer v. Imhoff, 26 Penna. St. 438; McCarty v. Kitchenman,
47 Id. 239 ; Phillips v. Phillips,48 Id. 178 ; PennsylvaniaBailroad Co. v. Jones, 50 Id. 417; Cannon v. Boyd, 73 Id. 179;
Thompson et al. v. Miner, 30 Iowa 886; Huttenzeier v. Albro, 2
Bosw. 546; affirmed, 18 N. Y. 48. But in New Jersey the doctrine was held to be inapplicable to ways: Fetters v. Hfunphreys
et als., 19 N. J. Eq. 471. And there are many English cases in
which the application of the doctrine to ways has been denied:
Pheysey et ux. v. Vicary, 16 M. & W. 484 ; Whalley v. Thompson
et al., 1 Bos.'& Pul. 371; Worthington v. Gimson, 2 El. & E.
618; Dodd v. Burehell, 1 I. & C. 113; Polden v. Bastard,4
B. & S. 258, and affirmed, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 156; Thompson v.
Waterlow, Law Rep. 6 Eq. 36; Langley et al. v. 1ammond, Law
Rep. 3 Exch. 161; and see Pearson v. Spencer, 1 B. & S. 571,
and affirmed, 3 B. & S. 761; Daniel v. Anderson, 31 L. J. N. S.
610, cited in Washburn on Easements, 3d ed. 59.
In Dodd v. Burchell, 1 H. & C. 113, the owner of an estate
had conveyed a part of it upon which there was a way ivhich he
claimed to be entitled to by implied reservation, upon the ground
that there bad been a continuous user of it for a number of years,
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and that without it the land retained could not be reasonably enjoyed. The Court of Exchequer decided against the claim. Chief
jBaron POLLOCK said: "There is a wide difference between that
which is substantial, as a conduit or watercourse, and that which
is of an incorporeal nature, as a right of way. In my opinion if
uie were to adopt the principle contended for, it would be a most
dangerous innovation of modern times. The law seems to me
particularly careful and anxious to avoid important rights to land'
being determined by parol evidence and the prejudices of a jury."
In Worthington v. Gimson, 2 El. & E. 618, Justice CROMPTON
uses the following language: "It is said that this way passed as
being in apparent and continuous easement. There may be a
class of easements of that kind, such as the use of drairls or sewers,
as part of the necessary enjoyment of the severed property. But
this way is not such an easement. It would be a dangerous innovation if the jury were allowed to be asked to say from the nature
of a road whether the parties intended the right of using it to
pass."
In Poldenp v. Bastard, 4 B. & S. 258, the owner of two adjoining estates devised them to different persons. There was on one
of them a well and pump to which the tenant of the other was,
when the will was made, and for some time before had been, in
the habit of resorting for water, with the knowledge of the testatrix, using a foot-way from his dwelling house into the yard where
the pump was. le had no supply of water on his own premises,
but might have obtained it there by digging a well fifteen or twenty
feet deep. The testatrix devised the premises "as now in the
occupation"' of the tenant. The devisee sold to the defendant,
who claimed the right to use the pump. The claim was not sustained. ERLE, 0. J., said: "There is a distinction between easements, such as a right of way or easements used from time to time,
and easements of necessity or continuous easements. The laws
recognise this distinction, and it is clear that upon a seveXance of
tenements, easements used as of necessity, or in their nature continuous, will pass by implication of law without any words of grant;
but with regard to easements which are used from time to time
only, they do not pass, unless the owner, by appropriate language,
shows arl intention that they should pass. The right to go to a
well and take water is not a continuous easement, nor is it an
easement of necessity."
VOL,. XXV.-27
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We share the feeling expressed in these cases in regard to making rights in real estate dependent upon facts and circumstances
which may be differently interpreted by different minds. If the
grant of a way, existing previously de facto, can be implied from
anything short of necessity, we think at any rate that the party
claiming the way should be required either to show, as in Pettingill v. Porter, 8 Allen 1, that without the use of the way he will
be subjected to what,-considering the value of the granted estate,
will be an excessive expense; or to show, as in Thompson et al.
v. Miner, 30 Iowa 386, that there is a manifest and designed
dependence of the granted estate upon the use of the way for its
appropriate enjoyment, or to adduce some other indication equally
conclusive; and see Tlfortldngton v. Gimson, 2 El. & E. 618;
Leonard v. Leonard, 7 Allen 277, 283.
In the case at bar the legal grounds of the decision made in the
court below are not explicitly stated, but only the decision itself,
and the facts on which it was based. The question for us, as submitted to us in argument, is whether, the facts being as stated, the
decision was right. We think it was not. It does -not appear
that the defendant's estate is dependent on the Delany well for
its water supply, nor that the defendant has not a well of her own
or could not make a well for herself at moderate cost. And in
regard to the way, it does not appear to have been established in
the lifetime of Michael Coyle so definitely as to show a decision
on his part to subject the part of the estate now owned by the
plaintiff to a quasi servitude in favor of the other part-as, for
instance, he might have done by inclosing the way with a fence,
which should connect it with the part now owned by the defendant.
Indeed, we do not see that the case at bar differs materially from
Polden v. Bastard, 4 B. & S. 258, above cited; for, as we have
seen, the privilege of the well not having been expressly devised,
we cannot infer the way from the privilege, but must rather presume an extinguishment of the privilege unless the way may be
otherwise implied. If the facts are not such that the way may be
otherwise implied, the primd facie right of the plaintiff to have
his estate unencumbered by the way must prevail. We think the
way cannot properly be implied from the facts which are stated.
We therefore sustain the exceptions and grant the plaintiff a new
trial.
Exceptions sustained.
After reading the above opinion one
is impressed with the thought that there

is much to be said in favor of the decision of the court below. It might well
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be argued that as the use of the well was
re~ervd equally for the benefit of all
portions of the "lhomestead estate" at
tile time of the sale to Delany and the
testator, during his ownership of both
sections of land, having impressed upon
the portion owned by the plaintiff a
qutsi servitude or easement, for real
servitude or easement, of course, could

not be, the land servient and dominan
belon,ing to the same person, and tha
fact being presumably known to the devisees, the son and the daughter of the
testator probably his heirs, the land
would naturally pass to the devisees,
with the respective portions charged and
benefited, as they were in the testator's
lifetime ; unless something should appear in the devise, manifesting the intention of the testator to change the
character of the enjoyment of the land ;
and that the devise in fee simple is not
enough per se to manifest such intention
since the enjoyment of an estate in fee
simple is by no means inconsistent with
its enjoyment subject to an easement,
and as the will is to be taken as a whole
and the intention of the testator collected therefrom (3 Burr. 1541, 1581 ;
.Ruston v. Ruston, 2 I)all. 244), if the
devise to plaintiff's grantor "1gave the
devisee as perfect an estate as the devisor himself had and that was an estate
so unencumbered ;" so the devise to the
defendant gave her "as perfect an estate as the devisor himself had" and
that was an estate with tile advantage
of the use of the well annexed thereto
and solemnly reserved to it, and that as
to the use of the well the way, long
used by the testator, was iecessary, as no
presumption could be raised that the
owner of the Delany lot would permit
a new and more burdensome way to be
laid out upon his premises-as lie certainly could not be compelled to-the
way having been once located, the
power of location was gone for ever, and
in this case, the effect would be not

merely to change the way but to create
an additional and distinct one.
The English authorities seem to uphold the decision and to show a tendency to restrain ways by implication
to those of strict necessity (though occasionally straining the word "necessity" and sometimes taking a more liberal view as to the character of the
necessity), and by no means to favor
the granting of ways by implication as
original rights, or their revival after
extinction by unity of possession, and,
in view of the assumed non-continuour
character of ways, not to apply to that
species of easements the rule laid down
in Gale on Easements 40.
"Easements which are apparent and continuous are not merely those which nust
necessarily be seen, but those which
inay be seen or known on a careful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant with the subject."
In W lalley v. Tlompson, I B. & P.
371 (1799), it was held that a way extinguished by unity of possession did
not revive on severance. In Plant v.
James, 5 B. & Ad. 794 (1833), Lord
DENMAN said, " If the grantor wishes
to revive or create such a right he must
do it by express words or introduce the
words therein used and enjoyed " in
which case easements existing in point
of fact though not existing in point of
law would be transferred to a grantee."1
In Glace v. flarding, 27 L. J. (N.
*S.) Exch. 286 (1858), Baron BRAstWELL appears to be disposed to apply a
somewhat more liberal rule to ways
and to grant that there might be such a
thing as a continuous way. "It [a
lease] did not grant the right in terms
and the only way in which it could
grant it was that the condition of the
premises, at the time when the lease
was granted, showed that it was intended that the right of way should be exercised on tile principle I have adverted
to, that by the devolution of tIme tene-
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ments a right of way to a particular door
or gate would, as an apparent or continious easement, pass to the owners
and occupiers of both of them. But I
think that the way in question is not a
continuous and apparent easement within the principle of law * * * I found
my opinion upon tile condition of the
premises at the time tile lease was
granted."
In most of the English cases, there
were other outlets besides the oneclaimed
as a way by implication and as reasonably necessary, and therefore they do
not exactly cover the point of the principal case ; indeed in Pheysey v. Vicary,
16 31. & W. 484, it was doubted by
ALDERsoN, B., whether a new trial
should not be granted to try whether
the way claimed were not necessary to
the conraznnt occupation of the house,
although there was another outlet from
In Dodd v. Burchdll,
the premises.
there was an additional way.
Necessity has in some eases been given
In Pyer
a more liberal interpretation.
v. Carter, I H. & N. 972, it was said
that by necessity should be understood
the necessity at the time of conveyance
and as matters then stood without alteration. This case which was not that
of a way, has run the gauntlet of criticism and it is questionable how far it is
In
authority beyond its own facts.
Ewart v. Cochrane, 7 Jar. 925 (1861),

Lord

CA3tIELL

said: "When

two

properties are possessed by the same
owner, and there has been a severance
made of part from the other, anything
which was used and was necessary for
a comfortable enjoyment of that part
of the property which is granted shall
be considered to follow from the grant,
if there be the usual words of conveyance."
Polden v. Bastard, 4 B. & S. 258,
does not materially differ from the principal case, except perhaps in the particular, that in the English case, there

was evidence that water could be obtained on i le premises of the defendant
by digging a well of a certain depth, but
this distinetioun can be easily resolved to
a acre question of the burden of proof,
which Chief Justice DueFEE thinks
should rest upon the person claiming
the easement
In the United States, in Massaclhusetts, in the case of 1-'ttiagill v. Porter,
to the
8 Allen 1 (1869), it was left
jury to say whether there would be
unreasonable labor and expense in constructing another way, and in the Supreme Court, COIAr.MAH, J., said : "The
word ' necessity' cannot reasonably
be hell to be limited to physical necessity. If it were so, the way inquestion
would not pass with the land if another
way could be made bsyany amount of
labor or by any possibility."
In Fattersv. lHumphreq, 3 C. E. Green
(Cl.) 262 (1867), ZAnRsIE, Clh.,
remarked, " If until the time of severance of title there has been a way, or
drain, or other matter in the nature of
an casement, from one of the parcels
through the other, established and kept
up by the common owner of both, and
necessary for the beneficial enjoyment
of the dominant parcel, then an easement is created by such sale, devise or
partition. fDiscontinuous easements not
constantly apparent are only continued or created whsen they are necessary,
and that necessity cannot be obviated by
a substitute constructed on or over the
dominant premises."
In Pennsylvania, the doctrine, which
seems based rather in legal refinement
than on practical utility, that ways are
not continuous easements, and that,
therefore, the same rule as to visibility
and permanency, is not to be applied to
them as to other easements, is not regarded as law, and more liberality has
been shown in sustaining ways than
elsewhere. In Kibffer v. Inthoft, 2 Casey
438 (1856), the right to an alley-way
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through the servient in favor of the
dominant lortion of land, which two
portions had formerly belonged to one
proprtetorand had been sold at sheriff's
sale, with no mention of the right of
way, was sustained, although it was not
a way of necessity. Lnwts, C. J., said,
" It is obviott, therefore, that if the
dominant aid servient tenements become the property of the same owner,
the exercike of the right, which in other
cases would be the subject of an easement, is during the continuance of his
ownership, one of the ordinary rights
of property only, which he may vary or
determine at pleasure. The inferior
right of casement is merged in the
higher title of ownership : 2 Bing. 83;
9 Moore 166 ; 3Bulst. 340. * * Upon
a subsequent severance of the estate by
alienation of part of it, the alienee becomes entitled to all continuous and
apparent easements which have been
used by the owner, during the unity of
the estate and without which the enjoyment of the several portions could not
be fully had. * * * The owner may,
undoubtedly, alter the quality of the
several parts of his heritage, and if lie
does so and afterwards alien one part,
it is but reasonable that the alterations
thus made, if palpable and manifest and
obviously permanent in their nature,
shall go to the purchaser in the condition in which they were placed and with
the qualities attached to them by the
previous owner." The learned judge
also approved of the rules of the civil
law with reference to servitudes and
cited IPardessus, Traite de) Servitudes,
288, which (as given in Gale, p. 50) is
"If afterwards these heritages should
become the property of different owners,
whether by alienation or division
amongst his heirs, the service which the
one derived from the other and which was
simple ' destination du pue defiille,'
as long as the heritages belonged to the
same owner, becomes a servitude as
soon as they pass into the hands of
different proprietors."

In PIdllips v. Phillips, 12 Wright 186
(1864), 'TroMrso-i, J., said : 11In this,
although we do not recognise a way of
necessity, we see the reason for the
creation of thi private way (i. e., that
it was the only convenieut way), why
it was opened, kept open and used by
the owner and his family until his death,
and the same condition of things, as
regards the surroundings continuing,
we may presume that it must have been
the intention of the owner that it should
remain permanent, inasmuch as ho
made a final disposition by will of both
the dominant and servient portions,
without the slightest hint of a wish that
their relations to each other should be
changed." It will be noticed that the
court gave a different face to the devise
in fee from that given by the Rhode
Island court, and as its opinion is derived from a consideration of the whole
will, it would seem to .be in better accord with the usually received principles
of interpretation.
Pennsylrania PJiilroad Co. v. Jon q
14 Wright 417 (1865), recognises and
follows the foregoing case.
In Orerdeer v. Updegraff, 19 P. F.
Smith 119 (1871), which was the case
of an alley-way, WILLIAMS, J., said :
" But if there had been no express reservation of the right to the use of the
alley in the conditions of sale, and in
the deed delivered to the purchaser, the
latter would have taken it subject to the
servitude imposed upon it by the decedent for the use and benefit of the occupants of the adjoining lot. It was a
continuous and apparent easement and
the law is well settled that in such a
case a purchaser, whether at private or
judicial sale, takes the property subject
to the easement."
In Cannon v. Boyd, 23 P. F. Smith
179 (1873), where an alley-way was
claimed over a property which had been
sold at sheriff's sale, on behalf of a
property sold at the same sale, both
properties having belonged to the same
owner, L-rND, J., in the District Court,
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had charged: "The

only question in

This

was affirmed

by the

Supreme

this case is, what was the condition of
these two properties at the time of the
sheriff's sale ? If the condition of the
properties was such as to indicate that
the occupants of property now owned
by the plaintiff used the alley in question and had a right to do so, the

Court.
It will be seen by this short review
of cases that there is a considerable
conflict of authority, leading to no little
uncertainty, but that on the whole it can
hardly be said of ways by implication
that they are favorites of the common

verdict should be for the plaintiff."

law.

H. B., JR.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. v. MOORE, ADM'R OF TODD.
A party cannot be compelled to accept his adversary's admission in lieu of
affirmative evidence offered by himself.
Where a paper is admissible for one purpose, it does not become inadmissible
because it cannot be used for another. Thus where an administrator sues on a
life insurance policy, his letters of administration are admissible in proof of his
representative character, although they are not in such case evidence of the death
of the insured.
Though there.is no presumption of death from the fact of disappearance until
after seven years, yet a jury may infer death at an earlier date from circumstances or any other satisfactory evidence.
A clause in a policy of life insurance that the policy shall be void if the assured
die by his own hand, is in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, and the burden is
on the insurers to show that it has been incurred.
Such forfeiture is not incurred by self destruction while insane, and it makes no
difference whether the language of the policy is " die by his own hand" or by
',suicide."
The terms are synonymous.
Where the jury find the fact of death of the assured, but in answer to special
instructions to find whether or not he committed suicide, they return that they
cannot say, this does not vitiate the verdict. A general verdict for the plaintiff
would not be vitiated even by a finding that the assured committed suicide, unless
the jury also find that it was voluntary.

ERROR to Wayne Circuit.
The suit below was on a life policy in favor of William Todd,
who was claimed to be dead, but whose death was sought to be
proved by his disappearance, aided by circumstantial testimony.
The defence relied on was, 1. That he was not shown to be
dead; and 2. That if dead he died by his own act. The policy contained this clause : "3. That in case the person whose life is hereby
insured shall die by his own hand," &c., "this policy shall be
void, and the company shall not be liable for the loss."
Griffin and Dickinson, for plaintiff in error.
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A. 1. Jilkinson and _ouyt -Post,for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CA.PBELL, J.-An error is alleged on the reception in evidence
of the letters of administration. Defendants below admitted their
existence and the representative character of Mr. Moore, but objected to the admission of the letters themselves, because they
were not evidence of the death of Todd. The court held they
were not evidence of death, but admitted them in proof.
We do not quite comprehend the objection. A party can never
be compelled to accept his adversary's admission in lieu of record
evidence unless he chooses, and a paper which is admissible for
one purpose does not become inadmissible because it cannot be used
for' another. The letters were proper to show the plaintiff's capacity, and could not be excluded on any theory. Whether they
proved death was another matter, and in this case the court held
they did not.
The same remark will apply to the proofs of death submitted to
the company under the requirements of the policy. The admission
that such proofs had been furnished did not render it improper to
produce the documentary evidence, and prevented any subsequent
disputes as to the meaning and extent of admissions.
And it would be difficult to see how a party can be damnified by
proof which accords with his admissions.
The principal questions arise upon the rulings in the cause as it
went to the jury.
The defendant below's first request was as follows: "That under
the law there is no presumption of death until after a disappearance of seven years, and that the burden of proof is upon the
plaintiff in this case to show the fact of death. That it is not
incumbent upon the insurance company to show that the insured
it not dead, until after the lapse of seven years from date of disappearance."
This the court gave; but stated to the jury in substance that
death might be shown otherwise than by the production of an eyewitness to the act, and might be shown by satisfactory circumstances.
This was unquestionably correct. There is no doctrine which,
in civil cases, requires death to be proved by any more conclusive
or peculiar evidence than any other fact material to recovery in an
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action. If the testimony satisfies tile court or jury passing on
facts, and is reasonably sufficient, and compels belief, the conclusion is certainly lawful.
Upon the rulings of the court upon the second, third and fourth
requests of defendant below no exception was taken. They were
substantially granted, and related to the necessity of diligent
search and inquiry after the missing man, and the question of
suicide and the presumption of sanity.
Three requests were refused, which were, 5. That there was no
evidence of Todd's insanity at the time of his disappearance;
6. That there was no evidence of his death; and, 7. That under
the evidence plaintiff could not recover.
The evidence tended to show that Todd had been, for a considerable time, laboring under a very severe and dangerous disease
of the brain and spine, which in the opinion of his physician must
have proved fatal in a short time, and most probably have rendered
him insane. There was evidence of its effect on his feelings and
conduct, indicating that his mind was affected by the disease. The
testimony was such as to have a decided bearing on the question
of his sanity, and it was for the jury to pass upon it. It is not
for us to review their finding, if there was evidence before them
to be acted on. We have no means of knowing what they thought
of it, as they have not found specially on the subject.
As to the fact of death, we think there was not only competent
evidence, but such as they were fully justified in accepting as complete. A sudden disappearance, and the failure to discover any
traces of a man who, if living, could not easily have gone unnoticed,
and who was in such a physical and mental condition as to excite
the anxiety of his friends upon this very subject, cannot be said
to afford no evidence tending to prove his death. The instructions
of the court as to the diligence needed for a search after him,
were full and correct. The assiduity of friends in pursuing the
inquiry was great and constant. We think the jury had enough
to act upon.
They found a general verdict for the plaintiff. They were asked
to find whether Todd committed suicide, and answered they could
not say. It is claimed this vitiated their verdict.
Plaintiffs in error insist that the burden of proof is on the administrator to prove that Todd did not die by his own hand, and
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also that if he did so, the policy is void whether he was sane or
insane.
The condition which makes the policy void in case of such a
death is in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, and the burden
is on the insurers to show it, and not on the insured to negative it.
Tlere can be no presumption of wrongdoing without proof, and
the insured is not bound to show that his intestate had done no
act to destroy an existing right in the policy. This would be to
reverse the burden of proof generally adopted. Usually, where
the death is proved by eye-witnesses the circumstances are such
that the order of proof becomes less material, and thie facts connected with the death may be so peculiar as to need explaining.
Of course if the plaintiff suing upon a policy throws doubt over
his own case, or if his witnesses by their examination and crossexamination leave his case imperfect, he must clear it up or be
defeated. But when all the testimony on both sides is in, any
inference which will lead to a forfeiture can only be properly
drawn from a preponderance of proof that the forfeiture has been
incurred.
The forfeiture in this ease was to arise if the insured died by
his own hand. Some stress is laid on. the term "suicide," as if it
means a wrongful act, or self-murder. It has rib such restricted
meaning. It means self-killing, just as "homicide" means killing
any one else. But there may be excusable homicide as well as
felonious, and suicide was only cognizable at law when the person
was felo de se, or guilty of a felonious act. If non compos mentis,
the actor in homicide or suicide commits no crime. In one sense
a man dies by his own hand who kills himself, whether sound or
frenzied. But the condition in this policy cannot be construed to
cause a forfeiture for acts involving no evil will. The clause punishing the insured for self-slaughter is a penal clause in the strictest
sense of the term, and embraces several other acts in the same
penalty, all of which involve voluntary wrongdoing. They are,
death by duelling, or by the hands of justice, or in the violation
of the laws, or impairing health by vice or intemperance. When
an act which is to cause forfeiture is classed among such wrongful
conduct, it is fairly to be inferred that it is regarded as ejusdem
generis, and depending on the same reasons.
A construction which punishes a person who is not in fault is
not to be favored, if it can be allowed at all. The very object of
Vor. XXV.-28
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life insurance is to provide for death by disease or in the ordinary
course of nature. Death by his own hands, in the case of one
non compos is as much the result of disease as death by fever or
consumption. The act of an insane man is morally no more his
act than if it were mechanical.
We do not think it profitable to discuss the subject at large.
The authorities differ somewhat, but we do not think there is any
such preponderance of good sense in those decisions which treat ai
insane person like one in his senses, that we care to follow them.
A finding of suicide, without a further finding that it was voluntary, would not conflict with the general verdict, and would be
immaterial.
There is no error in the judgment, and it must be affirmed with
costs.
The foregoing case treats of many
important branches of the law of insurance. It is not proposed to discuss all
of them, but to submit some remarks
respecting one or two only.
I. The first matter referred to, viz.:
the admissibility of letters of administration to prove death, although not
principally in question, deserves notice
on account of its importance, and the
absence, perhaps, of final authority settling it.
The grant of letters of administration
by a probate court is regarded in the
law as a judgment. But if in persovam, it is clearly no judgment to which
the insurer of the decedent's life is a
party, or even a privy, and therefore,
according to the familiar rule, does not
bind him. The courts, however, regard
it as a judgment in rem, not in personam,
and inconsistent decisions have been
made in the attempt to apply the rule
that a judgment in rem binds all the
world.
In the notes to the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith's. Lead. Cas. 622,
it is laid down that "the universal
effect of a judgment in rem depends, it
is submitted, on this principle, viz. :
that it is a solemn declaration, proceeding from an accredited quarter, con-

cerning the status of the thing adjudicated upon, and ipso facto renders it
such as it is thereby declared to be."
If the court has jurisdiction, the decision upon the statusof the thing is final.
But what is status? There is a status
of things, and a status of men. The
word is not only of Roman origin, but
means a thing known to the Roman law,
derived by us from those English courts
where the civil law is the basis of the ecclesiastical. In the Digest (IV. 5, 11)
we read that the status of men is composed
of three heads : 1. Liberty; 2. Citizenship ; 3. Family. Each of these three
heads is a thing, and an adjudication as
to the status of the thing, is, properly
speaking, a judgment in rem. For example, a husband applies for administration upon his deeeased wife's property ; the court decides that his family
status entitles him to the letters, and so
awards them. True, the judgment
relates in a measure to the rights of a
person, but so must every judgment,
more or less, and if the intervention of
a personal right is to make a judgment
one in personum, obviously the distinction is annihilated. Now the adjudication being essentially as to the status of
the applicant, it may readily have conceded to it all the validity it requires,
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andlwhile in another court the grounds
on which it proceeds may not be controverted in order to impeach the result,
so, too, by a parity of reason, is the effect
of those grounds limited to the proof of
the result. No authority will then be
demanded to satisfy the mind that
because the Probate Court decides that
the wile is dead, and therefore the husband being so entitled, may not in
another court, prove his wife's death by
proof of his own status.
These views are in entire conformity with the opinion of the judges in
the Duhess of Kingston's Case, supra,
and the learned notes of the editors, and
perhaps the reader will have already
deduced them for himself. Theapology
is, that if courts of justice and learned
writers like Greenleaf (Ev. 1, sect.
550), can hold the opposite opinion, it
is not useless to combat it.
It is not enough to argue that if
the letters should not be proof, yet they
should be evidence, for any evidence
may be held sufficient in a given case,
and so amount to proof.
The decision which is probably the
latest, as it is certainly the most authoritative, is that of Insurance Co. v.
Tisdale, 15 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 412,
where the Supreme Court of the United
States held that in an action on a policy
by a wife in whose favor it had been
issued, the fact of letters of administration having been granted to the plaintiff was no evidence of the death of the
assured. Tile fact that the letters had
been granted to the plaintiff, of course
made no difference, for the suit was in
her individual capacity as beneficiary.
Judge HuNT in his opinion cites numerous cases where the decisions were very
analogous in principle, as well as many
where the facts were similar. The case
will well repay perusal, and go far to
settle the law upon the subject. A
very interesting discussion also upon
tile effect of a judgment of a probate
court will be found in Rloderigas v.
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,S11r11T Institution, 15 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 205, and Judge REDFIELD'S note.
II. Another matter of great importance is the effect of clauses in policies
stipulating against suicide, and their
effect when suicide is committed in a
state of insanity. The subject is one
which is literally unsettled by the cases,
and their name is legion. An extended
review of them is unnecessary, because
Mr. Bigelow, in his Insurance Cases, has
exhibited a panorama, not to say a
menagerie, of text and notes, in which,
in the language of Lord ELDON, referring to the cases on the rule in Shelley's
Case, 2 Bligh 50, "the mind is overwhelmed by their multitude and the subtlety of the distinction between them."
The question in the cases is the
proper construction of the written contracts made by the parties, together, of
course, with its application to the facts
proved on the trial, or admitted in the
pleadings. No one doubts that the
contract of insurance should be construed like any other contract, but, it is
submitted, one may fairly doubt whether
the usual construction put upon the
clause is correct. The courts generally,
if not always, regard the clause as providing for a forfeiture, and the law generally, if not always, abhors a forfeiture,
just as nature used to abhor a vacuum
before the time of Newton. The words
in which the condition, as it is called, is
expressed are not uniform ; hut take a
common form, " provided that if the
assured shall commit suicide," &a. ;
that does not necessarily import a condition. It is sometimes loosely said
that the term ", provided that" or" pro.
viso" creates a condition ; to such as
say so a diligent perusal of Lord Cromwell's Case, 2 Coke R. 69 a, is recommended. It would be well to read it as
we are advised to read Littleton, viz.,
by meditation on every sentence, as
thereby it is confidently predicted the
reader will find many things of value.
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It will there be found that the term may
indicate a covenant, and even that it
may be used merely as a limitation.
In other words, it is not to be construed
to defeat the parties' inteution, but to
aid it, just as Lord HARDWXCKE declared that the Statute of Frauds was
not meant to advance fraud but to suppress it.
In the construction of contracts regard should he had to notorious facts
existing at the time of inception. Now
what more notorious than this: that
all calculations as to the probable duration of a man's life are based upon
experience of the ordinary course of
nature in its broadest sense, i. e., the
non ego, and that any extraordinary,
unnatural phenomenon will render them
worse than useless ? History, we are
told by high authority, can never be a
science ; we will never be able to predict
the future with scientific certainty, because the future will be what man's free
will makes it, and who can tell what
motives will exist, and how they will
affect their subject ' Mr. Buckle may
answer this, but Mr. Buckle is not yet
universally recognised as being all he
professes, and authority and reason,
.those two faithful witnesses, as CoKE
calls them, have not approved his doctrines. Now supply a man already
endowed with the power to do (for our
purposes) as he likes, with a powerful
motive, sane or insane, to put an immediate end to his life, and who can tell
how long he will live. or what premmum to charge? INo disciple of the
philosopher just named would invest his
money in insurance stogk if it was liable in all cases of suicide. His doctrines would be found CI inapplicable" to
the question in all probability, and a
change very speedily recommended.
Is it not probable that contracts of
insurance on life are made with reference to this general belief? It is not
unreasonable to interpret the contract
to mean this. That the man is insured

against death by the ordinary course of
things, t. e., disease or casualties happening through no fault of his own, that
As to say, the general words of assur.
ance are restricted by the proviso, which
defines the limits of the contract, instead of seeking to divest a right in the
contingency of the insured breaking a
condition.
It is not always that such a construction might be consistent with the
words of the policy, and others may
not be drawn artistically, but we may
still yield something propter simplicitatem laicoriun and not uproot the principles of construction.
If the construction suggested be accepted, then voluntary killing of one's
self, sane or insane, death by the hands
of justice for a crime voluntarily committed (for there must be the willing
mind), death in a duel to which the
insured voluntarily submitted, would be
cases for which there was never an
intention to insure; never an coggregutio
mcntun, never, therefore, any contract
at all : Kingsford v. Mferry, 1 HI. & N.
503; Deccan v. Shippei, 11 Casey 239.
If the construction be accepted then
the lawv would be simple, and the question always one of fact. Did the insured voluntarily cause his own death,
if so, the insurer is not liable, if not he
is. And an approach seemed to be
made to this in the two English cases
usually termed the leading ones : Borrodaile v. Iunter, 5 N. & G. 639, and
Clfft v. Schwabe, 3 M., G. & S. 437.
In both cases the assured, being more
or less insane at the time, voluntarily
killed himself; and in both cases it was
held that the insurer was not liable.
The later decision of Vice Chancellor
WooD in 1forn v. Insurance Co., 30
Law J. (Chanc.) 511, is not inconsistent
because there was in the policy in that
case no provision on the subject. The
learned judge held that suicide, in a
state of temporary insanity, was not a
legal offence, and the contract would
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not l,!
void on ground., of public policy,
and tlerctre was valid, and in that
liewie,doubtless right, for the words
of a-u.rance %%cre general and uire-

strictc,i.
Ai to the equivalence of "1suicide"
and "(lie by his own hand" no remarks are intended to be made. If
courts will pursue the beaten track of
con.ttraction,

it

appears

hopeless

to

begin a definition of the words that will
give them trouble, and so too of the
burden of proof as to the case being
within an exception to the policy ; that
is only one of many qucstions the occurrence of which is believed to be in
great measure factitious and unnecessary.
Mr. Bligelow in his note to Borrodailer. luntr, 2 Ins. Ca. 304, coneludes that " the weight of American
authority seems decidedly in favor of
the rule in Dean v. Anurican Life Ins.
Co., 4 Allen 96, that a life policy,
with a condition against suicide, is only
avoided when the aet, in a case of
insanity, is committed intentionally, and
with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences."
Tile subject, however, notwithstanding this opinion, is not and cannot be
called settled even by weight of authority, so long as courts of undoubted
reputation differ, and as tle Supreme
Court of the United States has no athority to settle the question for the
whole country, its decision in Insurance
Co. v. TrrT, 15 Wall. 580, will hardly
induce other courts to overrule their
own decisions, even if they admire the
other. In Terrg's Case the act of suicide was committed during insanity.
The court not only held that the provision "lie by his own hand" was inapplicable, but that even if the act was
voluntary there could still be a recovery,
as the insured's reasoning powers were so
far impaired that he did not understand
the moral character of the act, &c. It
would furnish an interesting labor to
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some gentleman of lcisure to go carefully through the reports and ascertain
exactly how many decisions were approved, affirmed, disapproved, doubted
and criticised in this case, whether
mentioned by name or not.
No one can estimate the loss to the
community in the great uncertainty that
prevails, the great loss by litigation, the
great mass of litigation itself, by reason of the uncertainty and the refined
distinctions with which the booksabound,
making each litigant hope that his case
will not be governed by such and such
a one, because there are minor points
of difference.
It is probable, however, that the difficulties and discrepancies on this point
will be gradually removed by the general adoption by insurance companies of
a clause in their policies relieving them
from liability where the assured dies by
his own hand, whether sane or insane.
Such a condition was sustained in
Pierce v. Travdler's Lfe Ins. Co., 34
Wis. 389, where it was said by Chief
Justice Dzxor that tfie plain meaning
of these words was to include every kind
of intentional self-destruction, without
reference to the moral responsibility of
the person.
This decision has been quoted approvingly, and followed by the Supreme
Court of the United States at the present
term, in Bigdow, Adrn'x, v. 7theBerkshire Life Ins. Co. The policy in that
case contained a condition in avoidance
if the insured shotld die by suicide,
sane or insane. The defendant pleaded
that the insured died from a pistol shot
wound inflicted by himself with intent
to destroy his life. To this the plaintiff replied, that the insured at the time
when he fired tile shot was of unsound
mind and wholly unconscious of the
act. To this replication defendant demurred, and the demurrer was sustained
by the court below. The decision wasaffirmed by the Supreme Court, DAVIs,
J., delivering the opinion, in which he

TIlE STATE r. BROWN.
maintained tile substantial identity of
and 'denth by
the phrases ''suicide"
his own hand," as previously decided in
Ins. Co. v. Terryl, 15 Wall. 580, and
held that the plain import and purpose
of the introduction of the clause in question were, because the line between
sanity and insanity is often shadowy
and difficult to define, to take the subject from the domain of controversy and
by stipulation exclude all liability by
reason of the death of the party by his
own act whether he was at the time a
responsible moral agent or not. "Nothing can be clearer," says the learned
judge, "than that the words sane or insane were introduced for the purpose
of excepting from the operation of the
policy any intended self-destruction,
whether the insured was of sound mind
or in a state of insanity. These words
have a precise, definite, well-understood
meaning. * * * It is unnecessary
to discuss the various phases of insanity in order to see whether a possible
state of circumstances might not arise

which would defeat the condition. It
xiill he time to decide this question
when such a case is presented. 1,'or
the purposes of this suit it is enough
to say that if the assured was con-cious
of the physical nature of the act he was
committing, and intended hy it to cause
his death, the policy is avoided, although
at tile time he was incapable of judg-

ing between right and wrong and did
not understand the moral consequences
of what he was doing. Any other construction would deny to the insurance
companies the right to declare the sense
in which they used words of limitation
in their policies."
The general adoption of this clause
by insurers, and a similar construction
of it by the courts, would seem to open
a way to uniformity in the rules of law
upon this increasingly important subject ; a most desirable result, which, except in some such mode, would seem to
be at present almost beyond hope of
attainment.
C. H. H.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.
THE STATE

EX REL.

BAXTER v. L. M. BROWN.

A day, in its ordinary meaning, is the space of twenty-four hours from midnight
to midnight.
Where a constitution provides for an election to fill a vacancy in the office of
judge "at the first election that occurs more than thirty days after the vacancy
shall have happened," the word " days" must be taken to be used in its ordinary
meaning ; and therefore neither the day on which the vacancy happens nor the day
of the election can be included in computing the time.

QUo WARRANTO.

ANDIEW G. CHATFIELD, judge of the Eighth

Circuit, died October 3d 1875, and on October 27th the respondent
was appointed to the vacancy thus caused, and entered on the
duties of the office. At the general election, held November 2d
1875, the relator, Luther L. Baxter, was elected to the office of
judge of the Eighth Circuit, and was duly qualified, but the re-

spondent claiming to hold and exercise the office, this proceeding
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was instituted to determine the title of tihe respective parties. To
the petition setting forth the foregoing filets, the respondent deniurred.
Sect. 10, Art. VI. of the Constitution of Minnesota, provides
that: "In case the office of any judge shall become vacant before
the expiration of the regular term for which he was elected, the
vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the governor, until a
successor is entitled and qualified. And such successor shall be
elected at the first annual election that occurs more than thirty
days after the vacancy shall have happened."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BErnRY, J.-The determination of the present controversy depends upon the meaning to be attributed to the words "more
than thirty days after the vacancy shall have happened."
A day is the space of twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight. This is the ordinary and popular meaning of the word, and
therefore, prima^ facie, the sense in which it must be taken to have
been used in our state constitution, which, as it was made by the
people, should be understood as they understood it. Applying
this definition to the constitutional provision in band, it follows
that neither the 3d day of October (the date of Judge CHATFIELD'S
death), nor the 2d day of November (the date of the election), can
be counted as one of the thirty days mentioned in the constitution.
Neither that portion of October 3d which remained after the hour
of Judge CIIATFIELD'S death, nor that part of November 2d which
preceded the hour of opening or closing the polls, was a space of
twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight.
Neither could a space of twenty-four hours from midnight to
midnight be made up by putting the fraction of October 3d and
that of November 2d together.
This construction necessarily leads to the conclusion that the election of the relator, L. L. Baxter, is void. This conclusion is, we
think, sustained by a consideration of the object of the constitutional provision in question. While the general purpose of the
constitution is to make judicial offices eldctive, this purpose is.
qualified by the provisions of section 10. As a part of qualification the last sentence of the section is evidently inserted in appreciation of the great importance of judicial offices, and of the consequent necessity that the electors, before being called upon to fill
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them, shall have such time for inquiry and consideration as will
enable them to act with reasonable prudence and good sense in the
premises.
The evil sought to be provided against was therefore such as
would result from an election occurring too soon after the happening of a vacancy, rather than such as would follow from deferring
an election too long.
If, as respects the question of computation of time, the language
of the constitution were per se so ambiguous as to admit of two
constructions equally plausible, it is upon the foregoing considerations clear that the construction should be adopted which will
beyond an peradventure accomplish this purpose of the constitution.
This will require the construction which would give the electors
the longest time for deliberation, that is to say, which would give
them thirty clear days between the day when the vacancy happened
and the day of the election.
This construction has the further advantage of relieving cases
of this kind from the obvious practical difficulties and embarrassments which not unfrequently might arise if it were held to be
either necessary or proper to take into consideration fractions of a
day, in computing the thirty days required by the constitution.
It follows from the foregoing views that the respondent is entitled
to the office of judge of the Eighth Judicial District.
Judgment for the respondent on the demurrer.
Some of the expressions of the learned
judge in the foregoing opinion, especially his definition of a day as "the
space of twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight," appear at first sight
as contrary to the common-law rule that
in legal computation there are no fractions of a day. Something, however,
may be conceded to the liberality of
construction always accorded to constitutional provisions. Thus in the Opinion
of the Supreme Court of New Ilampsire,
on the Soldier's Voting Bill, 4 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 212, it was held that the
days given by the constitution to the
governor to return bills to the legislature without his approval are days of
twenty-four hours each, and a veto

would be in time if delivered to the
speaker on the last day, though after the
legislative day had ended and the legislature adjourned.
The cases on the subject of the computation of time, with reference to including or excluding the day of a
date or of an act done, are collected in
the note to the Opinion, 4-c., 4 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 222 ; and, after careful examination of the very conflicting decisions, both in England and in this country, the conclusion is arrived at that
the better rule is to exclude from the
computation the day bf the act done.
The same subject, with special reference to the mode of counting the last
day when it falls upon Sunday, is also
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learnedly discussed in Mr. Marr's note
to Citizen:s Thmik v. 0.5r, 10 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 44, in which the same conclusion is reached, that the day of the
act (lone, as the starting point of the
computation, should e excluded. It
may indeed be said that although the
decisions are still conflicting and the
subject not free from doubt, yet the tendency of the later cases is clearly towards the rule already indicated, as
more in accordance with reason and
justice in the majority of cases, more
in accordance with the settled rules of
the commercial law and therefore tending to uniformity, and as affording a
convenient practical rule easilyapplicable and free from refinements and disputes about the special circumstances
of each case.

Applying this rule in the principal
case and excluding October 3d as the
day on which the vacancy occurred,
November 2d was only the thirtieth day,
and therefore the election was not more
tan thirty days after the vacancy as required by the constitution. The plain
intent of that provision was, as is said
by the learned judge, "to give the electors thirty dear days between the day
when the vacancy happened and the
day of the election." The case therefore was well decided on this ground
without the necessity of resorting to the
construction that requires a day to be
necessarily of twenty-four hours from
midnight to midnight; a construction
that might in some cases be extremely
inconvenient.

Supreme Court of the United States.
RICHARD WINDSOR v. WILLIAM N. MoVEIGH.
A sentence of a court pronounee against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard-is not a judicial determination of his rights,
and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.
The jurisdiction acquired by the seizure of property in a proceeding ia rem for
its condemnation for alleged forfeiture is not to pass upon the question of forfeiture
absolutely, but to pass upon that question after opportunity has been afforded to
its owner and parties interested to appear and be heard upon the charges for which
the forfeiture is claimed. To that end some notification of the proceedings, beyond that arising from the seizure, prescribing the time within which the appearance must be made, is essential.
In proceedings before the District Court in a confiscation case, monition and
notice were issued and published, but the appearance of the owner, for which they
called, when made was stricken out, his right to appear being denied by the court.
Hdd, that the subsequent sentence of confiscation of his property was as inoperative upon his rights as though no monition or notice had ever been issued. The
legal effect of striking out his appearance was to recall the monition and notice as
to him.
The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to
decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds,
after acquiring jurisdiction of the cause, according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs, and does not transcend in the extent
or character of its judgment the law which is applicable to it.
VOL. XXV.-29
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ERROR to the Corporation Court of Alexandria, Virginia.
This was an action of ejectment to recover certain real property
in the city of Alexandria. It was brought in the Corporation
Court of that city, and a writ of error from the Court of Appeals
of the state to review the judgment obtained having been refused,
the case was brought here directly by a writ of error from this
court.
The plaintiff in the Corporation Court proved title in himself
to the premises in controversy, and consequent right to their immediate possession, unless his life estate in them had been divested
by a sale under a decree of condemnation, rendered in March
1864, by the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Virginia, upon proceedings for their confiscation. The
defendant relied upon the deed to his grantor executed by the
Marshal of the District upon such sale.
,The proceedings mentioned were instituted under the Act of
Congress of July 17th 1862, "to suppress insurrection, to punish
treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels,
and for other purposes."
In July 1868, the premises in controversy were seized by the
Marshal of the District, by order of the District-Attorney, acting
under instructions from the Attorney-General. In August following, a libel of information against the property was filed in the
name of the United States, setting forth that the plaintiff in this
case was the owner of the property in question; that he had, since
the passage of the above act, held an office of honor and trust
under the government of the so-called Confederate States, and, in
various ways, had given aid and comfort to the rebellion; that the
property had been seized in pursuance of the act, in compliance
with instructions from the Attorney-General, and, by reason of
the premises, was forfeited to the United States, and should be
condemned. It closed with a prayer, that process of monition
might issue against the owner or owners of the property, and all
persons interested or claiming an interest therein, warning them
at some early 'day "to appear and answer" the libel; and as the
owner of the property was a non-resident and absent, that an order
of publication, in the usual form, be also made. Upon this libel
the district judge ordered process of monition to issue as prayed,
and designated a day and place for the trial of the cause, and that
notice of the same, with the substance of the libel, should be
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given by publication in a newspaper of the city, and by posting at
the door of the court-house. The process of monition and notice
were accordingly issued and published. Both described the land
and mentioned its seizure, and named the day and place fixed for
the trial. The monition stated, that at the trial all persons interested in the land, or claiming an interest, might "appear and make
their allegations in that behalf." The notice warned all persons
to appear at the trial "to show cause why condemnation should
not be decreed and to intervene for their interest."
The owner of the property, in response to the monition and
notice, appeared by counsel, and filed a claim to the property and
an answer to the libel. Subsequently, on the 10th of March 1864,
the District-Attorney moved that the claim and answer, and the
appearance of the respondent by counsel, be stricken from the
files, on the ground that it appeared from his answer that he was
at the time of filing the same a "resident within the city of
Richmond, within the Confederate lines, and a rebel." On the
same (lay the motion was granted, and the claim and answer
ordered to be stricken from the files. The appearance of the
respondent was by his answer. The court immediately entered its
sentence and decree, condemning the property as forfeited to the
United States, reciting that the usual proclamaition having been
made, the default of all persons had been duly entered. The decree ordered the issue of a venditioni exponas for the sale of the
property, returnable on the 16th day of the following April. At the
sale under this writ, the grantor of the defendant became the purchaser.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The authority for a writ of error directly to the inferior court will be found in Gregory v. 0ic Veigh, 23 Wall. 294. The
question for determination is whdther the decree of condemnation,
rendered without allowing the owner of the property to appear in
response to the monition, interpose his claim for the property and
answer the libel, was of any validity. In other words, the question is whether the property of the plaintiff could be forfeited by
the sentence of the court in a judicial proceeding to which he was
not allowed to appear and make answer to the charges against
him, upon the allegation of which the forfeiture was demanded.
There were several libels of information filed against the proFIELD,
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perty of the plaintiff at the same time with the one here mentioned.
They were identical in their allegations, except as to the property
seized, and the same motion to strike from the files the appearance, claim and answer of the respondent was made in each case,
and on the same day, and similar orders were entered, and like
decrees of condemnation. One of these was brought here, and is
reported in 11 Wallace. In delivering the unanimous opinion of
this court, upon reversing the decree in the case, and referring to the
order striking out the claim and answer, Mr. Justice SwiYNE said:
;,The order in effect denied the respondent a hearing. It is alleged he was in the position of an alien enemy, and could have no
locu8 8tandi in that forum. If assailed there he could defend
there. The liability and right are inseparable. A different result would be a blot upon our jurisprudence and civilization. We
cannot hesitat6 or doubt on the subject. It would be contrary to
the first principles of the social compact, and of the right administration of justice :" 11 Wall. 267.

The principle stated in this terse language lies at the foundation
of all well-ordered systems of jurisprudence. Wherever one is
assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend, for
the liability and the right are inseparable. This is a principle of
natural justice, recognised 'as such by the common intelligence and
conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced
against a party without bearing him, or giving him an opportunity
to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his case, and is not
entitled to respect in any other tribunal.
That there must be notice to a party of some kind, actual or
constructive, to a valid judgment affecting his rights, is admitted.
Until notice is given the court has no jurisdiction in any case to
proceed to judgment, whatever its authority may be, by the law
of its organization, over the subject-matter. But notice is only
for the purpose of affording the party an opportunity of being
heard upon the claim or the charges made; it is a summons
to him to appear and speak, if he has anything to say, why the
judgment sought should not be rendered. A denial to a party of
the benefit of a notice would be in effect to deny that he is entitled to a notice at all, and the sham and deceptive proceeding
had better be omitted altogether. It would be like saying to a
party,appear and you shall be heard, and when he has appeared,
saying your appearance shall not be recognised, and you shall not
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be healrd. In the present case, the District Court not only in
effect said this, but immediately added a decree of condemnation,
reciting that the defiult of all persons had been duly entered. It
is difficult to speak of a decree thus rendered with moderation;
it was in fact a mere arbitrary edict, clothed in the form of a judicial sentence.
The law is and alw.iys has been that, whenever notice or citation
is required, the party cited has the right to appear and be heard,
and when the latter is denied the former is ineffectual for any purpose. The denial to a party in such a case of the right to appear
is in legal effect the recall of the citation to him. The period
within which the appearance must be made and the right to be
heard exercised, is, of course, a matter of regulation depending
either upon positive law, or the rules or orders of the court, or
the established practice in such cases. And if the appearance be
not made, and the right to be heard be not exercised within the
period thus prescribed, the default of the party prosecuted, or possible claimants of the property, may of course be entered, and the
allegations of the libel be taken as true for the purpose of the proceeding. But the denial of the right to appear and be heard at
all is a different matter altogether.
The position of the defendant's counsel is that, as the proceeding for the confiscation of the property was one in rem, the court,
by seizure of the property, acquired jurisdiction to determine its
liability to forfeiture, and consequently had a right to decide all
questions subsequently arising in the progress of the cause, and
its decree, however erroneous, cannot therefore be collaterally
assailed. In supposed support of this position opinions of this
court in several cases are cited, where similar language is used
respecting the power of a court to pass upon questions arising after
jurisdiction has attached. But the preliminary proposition of the
counsel is not correct. The jurisdiction acquired by the court by
seizure of the res was not to condemn the property without further
proceedings. The physical seizure did not of itself establish the
allegations of the libel, and could not, therefore, authorize the
immediate forfeiture of the property seized. A sentence rendered
simply from the fact of seizure would not be a judicial determination of the question of forfeiture, but a mere arbitrary edict of the
judicial officer. The seizure in a suit in rem only brings the property seized within the custody of the court, and informs the
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owner of that fact. The theory of the law is that all property is
in the possession of its owner in person or by agent, and that its
seizure will, therefore, operate to impart notice to him. Where
notice is thus given the owner has the right to appear and be heard
respecting the charges for which the forfeiture is claimed. The
right must be recognised and its exercise allowed before the court
can proceed beyond the seizure to judgment. The jurisdiction
acquired by the seizure is not to pass upon the question of forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon the question after opportunity has
been afforded to its owner and parties interested to appear and be
heard upon the charges. To this end some notification of the
proceedings, beyond that arising from the seizure, prescribing the
time within which the appearance must be made, is essential. Such
notification is usually given by monition, public proclamation or
publication in some other form. The manner of the notification
is immaterial, but the notification itself is indispensable.
These views find corroboration in the opinion of Mr. Justice
STORY, in the case of Bradstreet v. Tlie Neptune Insurance Co.,
3 Sumner 601. In that case the action was upon a policy of
insurance upon a vessel, the declaration alleging its loss by seizure
of the Mexican government, The defendants admitted the seizure,
but averred that it was made, and that the vessel was condemned
for violation of the revenue laws of Mexico, and to prove the averment, produced a transcript of the record of the proceedings of
the Mexican court againt the vessel, and of the decree of condemnation. Among the questions considered by the court was
the effect of that record as proof of the laws of Mexico, and of
the jurisdiction of the court and the cause of seizure and condemnation. After stating that the sentence of a foreign court of
admiralty and prize in rem was in general conclusive, not only
in respect to the parties in interest, but also for collateral puiposes
and in collateral suits, as to the direct matter of title and property
in judgment, and as to the facts on which the tribunal professed to
proceed, Mr. Justice STORY said, that it did not strike him that
any sound distinction could be made between a sentence pronounced
in rem by a court of admiralty and prize, and a like sentence pronounced by a municipal court upon a seizure or other proceeding
in rem, that in each the sentence was conclusive as to the title and
property, and it seemed to him was equally conclusive as to the
facts on which the sentence professed to be founded. But the
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learned judge added, that it was an essential ingredient in every
case, when such effect was sought to be given to the sentence, that
there should have been proper judicial proceedings upon which to
found the decree, that is, that there should have been some certain
written allegations of the offence, or statement of the charge for
which the seizure was made, and upon which the forfeiture was
sought to be enforced; and that there should be some personal
or public notice of the proceedings, so that the parties in interest,
or their representatives or agents, might know what the offence
was with which they were charged, and might have an opportunity
to defend themselves and to disprove the same. "It is a rule,"
said the learned judge, "founded in the first principles of natural
justice, that a party shall have an opportunity to be heard in his
defence before his property is condemned, and that charges on
which the condemnation is sought shall be specific, determinate
and clear. If a seizure is made and condemnation is passed without the allegation of any specific cause of forfeiture or offence, and
without any public notice of the proceedings, so that the parties
in interest have no opportunity of appearing and making a defence, the sentence is not so much a judicial sentence as an arbitrary sovereign edict. It has none of the elements of a judicial
proceeding, and deserves not the respect of any.foreign nation. It
ought to have no intrinsic credit given to it, either for its justice or
for its truth, by any foreign tribunal. It amounts to little more,
in common sense and common honesty, than the sentence of the
tribunal which first punishes and then hears the party-castigat"
auditque. It may be binding upon the subjects of that particular
nation, but upon the eternal principles of justice it ought to have
no binding obligation upon the rights or property of the subjects
of other nations, for it tramples under foot all the doctrines of international law, and is but a solemn fraud if it is clothed with all
the forms of a judicial proceeding."
In another part of the same opinion the judge characterized such
sentences "as mere mockeries, and as in no just sense judicial
proceedings," and declared that they "ought to be deemed both
ex directo in rem and collaterally, to be mere arbitrary edicts or
substantial frauds."
This language, it is true, is used with respect to proceedings in
rem of a foreign court, but it is equally applicable and pertinent
to proceedings in rem of a domestic court, when they are taken
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without any monition or public notice to the parties. In Woodrufi
v. Taylor, 20 Vermont 65, the subject of proceedings in rem in
our courts is elaborately considered by the Supreme Court of Vermont. After stating that in such cases notice is given to the whole
world, but that from its nature it is to the greater part of the world
constructive only, and mentioning the manner in which such notice
is given in cases of seizure for violation of the revenue laws, by
publication of the substance of the libel, with the order of the
court thereon, specifying the time and place of trial, and by proclamation for all persons interested to appear and contest the forfeiture claimed, the court observed that, in every court and in all
countries wherejudgments are respected, notice of some kind was
given, and that it was just as material to the validity of a judgment in rem that constructive notice at least should appear to have
been given as that actual notice should appear before the record
of a judgment in per8onam. "A proceeding," continued the court,
"professing to determine the right of property, where no notice,
written or constructive, is given, whatever else it might be called,
would not be entitled to be dignified with the name of a judicial
proceeding. It would be a mere arbitrary edict, not to be regarded
anywhere as the judgment of a court."
In the proceeding before the District Court in the confiscation
case, monition and notice, as already stated, -were issued and published, but the appearance of the owner, for which they called,
having been refused, the subsequent sentence of confiscation of
his property was as inoperative upon his rights as though no monition or notice had ever been issued. The legal effect of striking
out his appearance was to recall the monition and notice as to him.
His position with reference to subsequent proceedings was then
not unlike that of a party in a personal action after the service
made upon him has been set aside. A service set aside is never
service by which a judgment in the action can be upheld.
The doctrine invoked by counsel that where a court has once
acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which
arises in the cause, and its judgment, however erroneous, cannot
be collaterally assailed, is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition, but, like all general propositions, is subject to many qualifications in its application. All courts, even the highest, are more
or less limited in their jurisdiction ; they are limited to particular
classes of actions, such as civil or criminal; or to particular modes
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of administering relief, such as legal or equitable ; or to transactions of a special character, such as arise on navigable waters, or
relate to the testamentary disposition of estates; or to the use of
particular process in the enforcement of these judgments. Norton
v. Meador, Circuit Court for California. Though the court may
possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject-mattcr and of the
parties, it is still limited in its modes of procedure and in the extent and character of its judgments. It must act judicially in all
things, and cannot then transcend the power conferred by the law.
If, for instance, the action be upon a money demand, the court,
notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over the subject and
parties, has no power to pass judgment of imprisonment in the
penitentiary upon the defendant. If the action be for a libel
or personal tort, the court cannot order in the case a specific performance of a contract. If the action be for the possession of real
property, the court is powerless to admit in the case the probate
of a will. Instances of this kind show that the general doctrine
stated by counsel is subject to many qualifications. The judgments
mentioned, given in the cases supposed, would, not be merely erroneous, they would be absolutely void, because the court in rendering them would transcend the limits of its authority in those cases.
See the language of Mr. Justice MILLER, to the same purport, in
the case of Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163. So it was held by
this court in Bigelow v. Porrest, 9 Wall. 851, that a judgment in
a confiscation case condemning the fee of the property was void
for the remainder, after the termination of the life estate of the
owner. To the objection that the decree was cohclusive that the
entire fee was confiscated, Mr. Justice STRONG, speaking the unanimous opinion of the court, replied: "Doubtless a decree of a
court having jurisdiction to make the decree, cannot be impeached
collaterally; but under the Act of Congress the District Court
had no power to order a sale which should confer upon the purchaser rights outlasting the life of French Forrest, the owner.
Had it done so, it would have transcended its jurisdiction." 9
Wall. 350.
So a departure from established modes of procedure will often render the judgment void: thus the sentence of a persoii charged with
felony, upon conviction by the court, without the intervention of a
jury, would be invalid for any purpose. The decree of a court
VoL. XXV.-30
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of equity upon oral allegations, without written pleadings, would
be an idle act, of no force beyond that of an advisory proceeding
of the chancellor; and the reason is that the c6urts are not authorized to exert their power in that way.
The doctrine stated by counsel is only correct when the court
proceeds, after acquiring jurisdiction of the cause, according to
the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs, and does not transcend in the extent or character of its
judgment the law which is applicable to it. The statement of the
doctrine by Mr. Justice SWAYNE in the case of Cornell v. Williams,
20 Wall. 250, is more accurate. "The jurisdiction," says the
justice, "having attached in the case, everything done within
the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned, is
held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for
fraud."
It is not within the power of the jurisdiction of the District
Court to proceed with the case, so as to affect the rights-of the
owner after his appearance had been stricken out, and the benefit
of the citation to him thus denied. For jurisdiction is the right
to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing. And
where, as in that case, no appearance was allowed, there could be
no hearing or opportunity of being heard, and therefore could be
no exercise of jurisdiction. By the act of the court, the respondent was excluded from its jurisdiction. *
The judgment of the Corporation Court is affirmed.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
STATE OF INDIANA v. HENRY THROCKMORTON.
There may be an unlawful intention to kill and yet the killing be only manslaughter, if it be without malice, as e. g., upon sudden heat or quarrel.
Therefore, an indictment for assault and battery with intent to commit manslaughter, is good.
Where a statute provides that upon an indictment for an offence, consisting of
different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged,
but guilty of any degree inferior thereto ; the jury, upon an indictment for assault
and battery with intent to murder, may find a verdict of guilty of assault and battery with intent to commit manslaughter. Therefore, where an indictment charged
in the first count an assault with intent to murder, and in the second, an assault
with intent to commit manslaughter, and the court on motion quashed the second
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count, on the ground that there was no such crime as an assault with intent to commit manslaughter, it was held, that although it was error to quash the second count,
yet as the defendant might have been convicted of the offence therein charged
under tihe first count, the judgment would not be reversed.

from the Allen County Criminal Court.
Throckmorton, the appellee, was indicted for an aggravated
assault and battery. The indictment was in two counts. The
second of which was as follows: "The grand jurors aforesaid upon
their oath aforesaid do further charge and present that Henry
Throckmorton, at said county of Allen and state of Indiana, on
the seventh day of October, A. D. 1875, in and upon one William
Meredith did make an assault, and him, the said William Meredith
did then and there feloniously and unlawfully touch, in a rude,
insolent and angry manner, with *intentthen and there and thereby
him, the said William Meredith, unlawfully and feloniously to
kill, contrary to the form of the statute, &e."
This count was
quashed by the court below, on the ground that it charged an
assault and battery with intent to commit manslaughter, and the
court being of the opinion that there was no such crime known to
the law.
APPEAL

Samuel .M fence, prosecuting attorney for the state.
Stratton & Stratton, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DOWNEY, J.-Of manslaughter there are two kinds, voluntary
and involuntary. It may be conceded that there can be no such
thing as an assault, or an assault and battery, with intent to commit
manslaughter of the involuntary kind. But not so we think as to
voluntary manslaughter. The statute defines manslaughter as
follows: "If any person shall unlawfully kill any human being
without malice, express or implied, either voluntarily upon a sudden
heat, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act,
such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, &c. :" 2 G. &
H. 438, sect. 8. The next following section is the one on which
this indictment is founded. It reads as follows: "Every person
who shall perpetrate an assault or an assault and battery with
intent to commit a felony, shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned, &c."
We are aware that many criminal lawyers of this
state are of the opinion that there can be no such thing as an
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assault, or an assault and battery, with intent to commit manslaughter. It is said by Judge Jlicknell in his work on Criminal
Law, that "there can be no indictment for an assault and battery
with intent to commit the crime of manslaughter, because the
peculiarity of manslaughter is that it is free from unlawful intention
to kill :" Bicknell's Crim. Prac. 292. It is a mistake to say that
there can be no unlawful intention to kill in voluntary manslaughter: lurphy v. Thte State, 31 Ind. 511. Mr. Bishop, in his work
on Statutory Crimes, sect. 508, expresses the opposite view to that
tiken by Judge Bicknell, and thinks such view contrary to the
actual course of things in the other states, and "not sound as
general American doctrine." In New Hampshire there was a
statute providing "that if any person shall make an assault upon
another, with intent to commit any crime described in this chapter,
the punishment whereof shall be, &c., he shall be punished," &c.,
and manslaughter was among the crimes described; it was held
that this provision embraced among the rest an assault with intent
to commit manslaughter: Tie State v. Uollegan, 17 N. H. 253.
In Aurphy v. The State, supra, the court, in speaking of the
instructions given, said: "By these instructions the jury were told
in effect, that there could be no purpose to kill in manslaughter,
and that if such a purpose were shown to exist, the killing would
be murder. This we think is not a correct exposition of the law.
The killing may be unlawful and purposely done, and yet, if it is
done without malice, in a sudden heat and transport of passion,
caused by a sufficient provocation, it is only manslaughter. It was
so held in Dennison v. Te State, 13 Ind. 510." A reference
to the case in 13 Ind. will show that the question was there so
decided. The case of Dennison v. The State is cited and followed
in Hoss v. The State, 18 Ind. 349, and Long v. The State, 46
Ind. 582. But notwithstanding we are of the opinion that the
second count in the indictment was good, we cannot reverse the
judgment because the court held it bad. The first count charged
the defendant with an assault and battery with the intent feloniously,
purposely and with premeditated malice to kil" and murder. Upon
this count the prisoner was tried and acquitted. There is no doubt,
we think, that the defendant might, had the evidence warranted
it, been found guilty on the first count of an assault and battery
with intent to commit manslaughter: Bishop's Statutory Crimes,
sect. 503. The state was not, therefore, injured by the ruling of
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the court in quashing the second count of the indictment. It
will follow from this ruling that a party indicted for an assault, or
an assault and battery with intent to commit murder in the first
degree, may, if the evidence justify it, be convicted of the assault,
or assault and battery with intent to commit murder in the first or
second degree, or to commit manslaughter, or he may be acquitted
of any felonious intent and found guilty of the assault or assault
and battery only. It has been held that a party may be indicted
of an assault, or an assault and battery with intent to commit
murder in the second degree: The State v. Ke8ler, 8 Blackf. 575.
In such case, therefore, there may be a conviction, if the evidence
warrant it, of the assault or assault and battery, with intent to
commit murder in the second degree, or to commit manslaughter,
or, as in the other case, there may be an acquittal of any intent to
commit a felony, and a conviction of the assault or assault and
battery only. If a party be indicted of an assault or an assault
and battery with intent to commit manslaughter, he may in a proper
case be convicted of the whole charge, or he may be acquitted of
the intent to commit manslaughter and found guilty of the misdemeanor only. These rules are deducible from sect. 72, p. 405, 2
G. & H., which provides that upon an indictment for an offence
consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not
guilty of the degree charged, and guilty of any degree inferior
thereto.
The judgment is affirmed.

Supreme Court of New Brunswick.
THE SPRING HILL MINING COMPANY v. SHARPE ET

AL.

The condition of a bond given for the faithful discharge of the duties of the
treasurer of an incorporated company, declared that S. (the treasurer) should well
and truly account with the company, and the directors thereof, whenever required,
for all moneys, &c., which should come into his hands as treasurer, and should well
and faithfully obey all such by-laws, orders, directions and instructions as the
board of directors of the company should make, prescribe and appoint. One of
the by-laws of the company required that the treasurer should make his cash
deposits in the bank of New Brunswick, as the money was received, and that
all checks to draw the same should be signed by the president, or two directors
of the company, and countersigned by the treasurer. In an action on the bond,
alleging as a breach, that S. had received money as treasurer, which he had
neglected to pay over on request, and had converted to his own use, the surety
pleaded, that before any breach of the bond, S., with the knowledge, consent and
authority of the directors, did not deposit the money in the bank of New Bruns-
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wick, but kept it in his own custody, and paid it out on his own check, and as he
thought proper. Iid, on demurrer, that an order of the directors, not warranted
by the act of incorporation or the by-laws, was no justification for the treasurer in
misappropriating the money, and did not relieve the surety from liability.
DEBT on a bond given for the faithful discharge of the duties
of the treasurer of an incorporated company. Demurrer to the
pleas by the surety.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEN, C. J.-This is an action on a bond given by the defend-

ant Sharpe, as treasurer of the Spring Hill Mining Company, and
by the other defendant, Saunders, as surety, for the faithful performance of Sharpe's duties as treasurer. The bond, after reciting
that Sharpe had been appointed treasurer of the company, to perform such duties as properly belonged to the office of treasurer, or
as the directors of the company might at any time thereafter order,
direct and appoint to be done by him as such treasurer, stated the
condition of the bond to be, inter alia, that Sharpe should at all
times thereafter, so long as he continued to be employed as treasurer, well and faithfully behave himself in all things relating to
the said office, or to duties to be required of, or performed by him
for the company, and should well and truly account with the company and the directors thereof, whenever thereto required, for all
moneys, funds, securities, books, &c., which should come into his
hands during his service as treasurer, and pay over and deliver the
same, or any of them, when required. by the company, or the
directors for the time being, to such person or persons as the
directors might appoint and direct to receive the same; and should
well, truly and faithfully obey and keep all such by-laws, regulations, orders, act of incorporation, directions and instructions, as
the board of directors for the time being, of the said company,
should make, ordain, prescribe and appoint. The breaches assigned, were: 1st. That while Sharpe held the office of treasurer,
he wrongfully withheld and misapplied divers sums of money, to
wit, the sum of $9194, which had been collected and received by
him as treasurer on account of the plaintiffs, and converted the same
to his own use. 2d. That while Sharpe held the office of treasurer,
the sum of $9194 was received by him as such, and though often
requested so to do, he did not account for the same to the plaintiff,
but wholly neglected and omitted so to do. 3d. That the sum of
$9194 came into the hands of Sharpe as treasurer of the company,
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and, though often requested by the plaintiffs, he did not pay over
and deliver the said money to them, but wholly neglected and
omitted so to do.
The defendant, Saunders, pleaded, 1st. That by a by-law of the
company passed on the 19th May 1873, it was provided that the
treasurer should make his cash deposits in the bank of New Brunswick, or such other bank as the directors should appoint, as the
money was received, and that all checks to draw the same should
be signed by the president, or two directors of the company, and
countersigned by the treasurer. That by a further by-law passed
at the same time, it was provided that the directors should have thegeneral supervision of the affairs of the company. That the directors appointed the bank of New Brunswick as the bank in which
the treasurer was to make his cash deposits. That before any
breach of the condition of the bond, Sharpe, with the knowledge and
consent of the directors of the company, and without the knowledge
or consent of the defendant, Saunders, lent the money to other
persons, whereby the defendant Saunders was discharged from liability; and that all such loss as had been sustained by the plaintiffs, by reason of the supposed breaches of the condition of the
bond, had arisen by and through the negligence and misconduct
of the directors, and not otherwise. 2d. That before any of the
supposed breaches, all the moneys of the plaintiffs in the hands of
Sharpe, by the carelessness and neglect of the plaintiff and of the
directors, and in disobedience of the by-laws of the company, were
not deposited in the bank of New Brunswick as required by the
by-laws, but were, with the knowledge, consent and authority of
the directors, and without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, Saunders, kept by Sharpe in his custody, and by the like
knowledge, consent and authority of the directors, and without the
knowledge or consent of the defendant, Saunders, were not drawn
out of any bank by check, signed by the president or two directors, and countersigned by the treasurer of the company, but were
paid out by Sharpe by his own check, or otherwise, as he thought
proper; whereby the defendant, Saunders, was discharged from
liability for Sharpe in that respect.
I think both these pleas are bad. Assuming that there is no
substantial difference between an act done by Sharpe with the con8ent, and an act done by the authority, of the directors, the pleas
allege, and admit that it was Sharpe's duty, under the by-laws of
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the company, to deposit in the bank of New Brunswick the moneys
which came into his hands; that he did not do so; but, with the
knowledge, consent and authority of the directors, kept the money
inhis own custody, and lent it, or paid it out as he thought proper and not in the manner prescribed by the by-law. These pleas
raise the question whether an order of the directors, made in violation of a by-law of the company, will relieve the surety of the
treasurer from liability. I think it will not. The obligation
which the surety enters into is, that Sharpe shall keep and obey
the by-laws ; and certainly, the mere consent of the directors that
-he should violate them, will not discharge the surety. But I put
the case as a broader ground, viz. : that an order of the directors
not warranted by the act of incorporation or the by-laws of the
company, is no justification of the officer, and will not relieve the
surety.
The principle involved in this case, is fully considered, and the
law very clearly laid down by Mr. Justice STORY, in the case of
Minor v. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 7 Curt. 445. That
was an action against the sureties in a bond given for the faithful
discharge of the duties of the cashier of a bank. One ground of
defence was, that by the usage and practice of the bank, the cashier had allowed customers to overdraw their accounts and to leave
their checks and notes charged without funds in the bank to meet
them; and it was contended on behalf of the sureties, that the jury
should have been instructed that those facts constituted a defence
to the action. Mr. Justice STORY, delivering the judgment of the
court, said: "If the instruction had been given, and thereupon a
verdict upon these issues had been found for the defendants, could
any judgment have been given upon these issues in favor of the
defendants; or, ought judgmeni non obstante veredicto to have
been for the plaintiff ? If it ought, then the error becomes wholly
immaterial, since in no event could the instruction, in point of law,
have benefited the defendants. Upon deliberate consideration we
are of opinion that the pleas on which these issues are founded are
substantially bad. They set up a defence for the cashier, that his
omission well and truly to perform the duties of cashier, was by
the wrong connivance and permission of the board of directors.
The question then comes to this, whether any act or vote of the
board of directors, in violation of their own duties, and in fraud
of the rights and interest of the stockholders of the bank could
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amount to a justification of the cashier, who was a particeps

crininisP We are of opinion that it could not.

However broad

and general the powers of the direction may be for the government
and management of the concerns of the bank, by the general language of the charter and by-laws, those powers are not unlimited,
but must receive a rational exposition. It cannot be pretended
that the board could by a vote, authorize the cashier to plunder
the funds of the bank, or to cheat the stockholders of their interest therein. No vote could authorize the directors to divide
among themselves the capital stock, or justify the officers of the
bank in an avowed embezzlement of its funds. The cases put are
strong, but they demonstrate the principle only in a more forcible manner. Every act of fraud, every known departure from
duty by the board, in connivance with the cashier, for the plain
purpose of sacrificing the interest of the stockholders, though less
reprehensible in morals, or less pernicious in its effects than the
cases supposed, would still be an excess of power, from itsjllegality,
and, as such, void as an authority to protect the cashier in his
wrongful compliance. Now, the very form of these pleas sets up
the wrong and connivance of the board as a justification; and such
wrong and connivance cannot for a moment be admitted as an
excuse for the misapplication of the funds of the bank by the cashier. The instruction prayed for, proceeds upon the same principles as the pleas. It supposes that the usage and practice of the
cashier, under the sanction of the board, would justify a known misapplication of the funds of the bank. What is that usage and practice, as put in the case ? It is a usage to allow customers to overdraw, and to have their checks and notes charged up, without present
funds in the bank. Stripped of all technical disguise, the usage
and practice thus attempted to be sanctioned, is a usage and practice to misapply the funds of the bank, and to connive at the withdrawal of the same, without any security, in favor of certain privileged persons. Such a usage and practice is surely a manifest
departure from the duty both of the directors and the cashier, and
cannot receive any countenance in a court of justice. It could not
be supported by any vote of the directors, however formal; and,
therefore, whenever done by the cashier, is at his own peril, and
upon the responsibility of himself and his sureties."
This clear exposition of the law, and its applicability to the quesVOL. XXV.-31
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tion now before us, warrants the somewhat lengthy quotation of
the language of the learned judge, which seems to me to be conclusive against the pleas in this case.
Obedience of the by-laws by Sharpe, was one of the very things
for which the surety bound himself. Can he be heard to say that
lie is absolved from his liability for a breach of those by-laws, because the directors of the company, in breach of their duty, either
consented to, or authorized the violation of them by Sharpe? No
order or direction of the directors with respect to the funds of the
company, unless within the legitimate authority of the board,
would be any justification to the treasurer. An order authorizing
him to retain the money in his own possession, and to pay it out
to whomsoever lie pleased, either by his own check, or otherwise,
in direct violation of the by-law which requires the money to be
paid into the Bank of New Brunswick, and to be checked out in a
particular way, is a clear departure from the duty both of the directors and pf the treasurer, and to use the language of Mr. Justice
STORY, cannot be supported by any vote of the directors, however
formal. This principle was acted on in this court, in the case of .Fellows v. TIe Albert 3ining Co., 3 Pugs. 203, where it was held that a
resolution of the directors of the company, voting a salary to the
president, which was not authorized by the act of incorporation, was invalid, and that no action could be maintained on a bond
or certificate of indebtedness under the corporate seal, founded on
such resolution.
The defendant's counsel relied on the language of Lord BROUGHAM in 11Mactaggartv. Watson, 3 Cl. & F. 542, where, speaking
of the liability of sureties, and the duties of creditors to conduct
themselves according to law, he says: "All this may be generally
true, and yet, it cannot avail to discharge a surety who has expressly bound himself for a person's doing certain things, unless it
can be shown that the party taking the security has by his conduct
either prevented the things from being done, or connived at their
omission, or enabled the person to do what he ought not to have
done, or leave undone what be ought to have done, and that but
for such conduct the omission or commission would not have happened."
It was contended that the present case came entirely within
those principles; that the plaintiffs by their acts and conduct had
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enabled Sharpe to do what he ought not to have done as treasurer,
and that they could not take advantage of their own wrongful act.
Had the plaintiffs been individuals suing in their own right, and
capable of acting in person, I am not prepared to dispute the proposition; but I think there is a difficulty in applying the same rule
to a corporation. The directors are merely the agents of the company. Their duties are pointed out by the act of incorporation,
or prescribed by the by-laws, which are the promulgated will of
the company. While they act within the limits of 'the authority
thus given them, the company is liable for their acts; but beyond
those limits cannot bind their principals. See the case of Te
Salem Bank v. The Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. 28. As the bylaws of the company are expressly referred to in the bond in this
case, the sureties are bound to know the duties they prescribe,
and it is no jqstification to say that the directors authorized the
treasurer to violate the by-law, and to commit a breach of his
duty.
It was also contended, that as by the condition of the bond the
treasurer was bound to obey the orders of the directors, any order
they made respecting the appropriation or payment of the funds of
the company, was a justification to him, if he acted in accordance
with it, and a discharge of his sureties. But those words of the
condition 'must receive a reasonable construction ; they must necessarily mean, such orders, directions and instructions as the directors can lawfully make and give, not any orders they may choose
to make in excess of their powers. The general supervision over
the affairs of the company, which the directors have, must be exercised "within the limits of their duties as defined by the gct of incorporation and the by-laws. To give the words of the condition
the unlimited construction contended for, would entirely defeat the
object for which th6 by-law was passed, directing the company's
moneys to be paid into the bank, and the manner in which they
This construction, therefore, cannot
were to be drawn out.
prevail.
For these reasons, I think the pleas are bad, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the demurrers.
The rest of the court concurring, judgment for the plaintiffs.

